T he introduction of the D-Mark in the German
Democratic Republic (GDR) on July 1, 1990 initiated the process of economic union even before official reunification on October 3, 1990. The exchange rate, influenced more by political than by economic considerations, greatly accelerated the collapse of the eastern German economy and in particular of its industry? Monetary union was a political necessity at the time and a prerequisite for reunification.
In the first six months following economic and monetary union, east Germany's gross domestic product (GDP) and industrial production sunk to about half the level of the previous year. 3 The highly overestimated capital stock of the GDR industrial Kombinate, or large state-owned conglomerates, together with the rapid rise in wages toward parity with western German levels, caused a wageproductivity gap in the economy as well as a gap between costs and returns for individual businesses. Following the introduction of the German mark (DM), eastern German goods were immediately confronted with competition from higher-quality, more cheaply produced western products. Eastern German consumers flocked to purchase these western goods that were previously unavailable to them under the GDR regime. As a result, eastern German imports ("imports" from west Germany and foreign imports) soared and sales of eastern German products fell dramatically. In addition, former markets to the East fell apart with the collapse of Comecon, the Soviet-led trading system of the eastern bloc." This combination of unfavorable factors produced the greatest shock in the goods-producing sector of the economy. Particularly hard hit were the tradeable manufactured goods. Of the four main subsectors of manufacturing (primary goods, capital goods, consumer goods and foods, beverages and tobacco), the export-oriented capital goods were most injured from international competition. Capital goods contribute the largest share of total sales to the manufacturing sector2
From 1990 until the end of 1994, the Treuhandanstalt was assigned the task of privatizing and restructuring the state-owned companies of the former GDR. The Treuhand's main goal was to sell the companies as fast as possible and thereby preserve east Germany's industrial base. Within four years the Treuhand succeeded in reducing its portfolio of firms 1 The five new L~nder, or new German states, are Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Pommerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia. Statistics for east Germany often include East Berlin.
According to the German Bundesbank, the official exchange rate amounted on average to 1.8:1.2,000 East Marks could be exchanged at a 1:1 rate for children under the age of 15, 4,000 East Marks for adults up to age 60, and 6,000 for people over 60. Most other currency was exchanged at a 2:1 rate. Private and business debts and loans were converted at a 2:1 rate. The 1:1 rate applied to price and wage contracts and pensions. Cf.: Gerlinde S i n n and HansWerner S i n n : Kaltstart: Aspekte der deutschen Wiedervereinigung, T0bingen 1991, p. 34.
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' The market in the Comecon countries cannot be considered an export market as such. The Comecon system functioned more like a domestic trading system, with the division of labor and trade directed by Moscow. REPORT by about 95%.s The rapid privatization wave, however, was accompanied by firm closings and the loss of a majority of jobs in manufacturing. Some misallocation of funds and faulty decisions also resulted. The successes and failures of the Treuhand and its successor organizations will surely be the topic of debate for years to come.
While manufacturing productivity levels fell by onethird shortly after the introduction of the D-Mark, eastern German wages rose considerably. 7 German industrial and labor unions for individual branches of the economy made agreements on increases in wages, which reached on average 71.9% (gross) of western German wages in 19942 Empoyment fell rapidly as a result, with some branches of industry cutting 80% of jobs. The rate of unemployment, officially non-existent under the GDR regime, rose vigorously to two-digit figures. Women, over 95% of whom had participated in the workforce in GDR times, now represent over two-thirds of the unemployed in many regions and have an average unemployment rate of over 20%. All in all, the collapse of the eastern German economy was more dramatic than even the pessimists had predicted2
Beginnings of the Growth Trend
Some sectors of the eastern German economy were able to bounce back from the economic collapse relatively quickly, indicating the first signs of general economic recovery. Following a 10% fall of east Germany's gross domestic product (GDP) in the first half of 1991 (compared with the second half of 1990), the economy achieved a growth rate of 7.8% in 1992 over the previous year. 1~ The increase in GDP was primarily the result of government capital inflows and an increase in domestic demand following monetary union. Between the second half of 1990 and the end of 1994, DM 525 billion flowed into the new Lander from west Germany, most of it to support investment and develop the infrastructure. 11 The rate of growth slowed slightly to 5.8% in 1993 on account of the recession in west Germany, but gained ground again in 1994 as GDP rose by 9.2%. The rate of growth of GDP in west Germany in comparison was 2.3% in 1994 and-1.7% in 1993. Even with these impressive growth rates, it will take a long time before the growth becomes self-sustaining and before the standard of living in east Germany reaches western German levels. In 1994, GDP per capita in the East was still only 48.3% of western German per capita GDR 12
Production began to recover in some sectors as early as 1991-92. The upswing came about particularly quickly in the construction industry, financed through heavy state transfers for public projects and through private investment. The services and crafts sectors also expanded in this early period. Even eastern German industry, after having suffered the hardest fall, has joined the path to progressive recovery. In 1993 industrial production as a whole rose faster than domestic demand for the first time since 1990, and net production in manufacturing increased in 1994 by 21.9% over the previous year? 3
The increase in overall production last year led to a slight rise in employment in the economy as a whole. The number of employed persons rose 1.1 % in 1994, after having fallen 3.0% in 1993.14 The unemployment 
